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the "laboratory" of the states. Id. at 2859
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia also concurred with the
Court's analysis but preferred that the
decision pronounce that the federal
courts have no business in this field. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring). He noted that
American Law has always accorded the
state power to prevent suicide. He added
that the cause of death in suicide and
starvation is the suicidal person's conscious decision to "pu[t] an end to his
own existence." Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 189).
In a vigorous and lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall
and Justice Blackmun, opined that the
majority's opinion failed to respect the
best interests of the patients. He stated
that "the right to be free from unwanted
medical treatment [was] categorically
limited to those patients who had the
foresight to make an unambiguous statement of their wishes while competent."
Id. at 2879 (Brennan,]., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, dissenting, questioned
the majority's definition of "life" by suggesting that, for patients like Nancy,
there is a serious question as to whether
the mere persistence of their bodies is
"life." Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He emphasized that "[t]he meaning and completion of her life should be
controlled by persons who have her best
interests at heart - not by a state legislature concerned only with the 'preservation oflife.'" Id. (Stevens,]., dissenting).
The Supreme Court recognized that a
"right to die" exists by virtue of the Due
Process Clause and mandated that it be
respected in states that have such legislation. Missouri properly chose to limit
this right by requiring clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.
Other limits on the right to die are left to
the states to define in their own "laboratories." It would appear that the confusion over the right to die has just begun.
- Lesley A. Davis
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Peel v. Illinois: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT'S COMMERCIAL
SPEECH STANDARDS ALLOW
AN ATTORNEY TO ADVERTISE
HIS CERTIFICATION
In Peel v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2281
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court
held that an attorney had a constitutionally protected right, under the first
amendment's commercial speech standards, to advertise his certification as a
trial specialist. States are, thereby, prohibited from completely banning these
advertisements but may use less restrictive measures to regulate them.
In 1987, the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois
("Commission") rued a complaint alleging that Gary Peel held himself out as a
certified legal specialist in violation of
the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2285.
Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois Code
of Professional Responsibility provides
that" a lawyer or law firm may specify or
designate any area or field of law in
which he or its partners concentrates or
limits his or its practice... no lawyer may
hold himself out as 'certified' or a 'specialist.''' Id. at 2286. Peel's professional
letterhead included the notation "Certified Civil Trial Specialist by the National
Board ofTrial Advocacy" ("NBTA"), followed by the words "Licensed: Illinois,
Missouri, Arizona." Id. at 2285.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the letterhead was misleading in three
ways. First, on the letterhead, the certification was listed prior to the licensure,
and the court found that the public
could mistakenly construe that Peel's
authority to practice trial advocacy came
from the NBTA, thereby" impinging on
the exclusive authority" of the courts to
license attorneys. Id. at 2286. Second,
the NBTA certification implied that
Peel's legal services as a trial advocate
were superior to other attorneys' services, and thirdly, that NBTA certification
was a product of state licensure. Id. at
2287. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme
Court followed the Commission's recommendation and censured Peel. Id at
2286.
The Supreme Court found that NBTA
was a well recognized organization requiring exacting standards for certification. These standards included jury and
non-jury trial experience as lead counsel, successful completion of a day-long

examination, continuing legal education
requirements, and demonstrated writingability.Id. at 2284-85. The Court also
found that certification must be renewed
every five years and that several states,
including Minnesota and Alabama, recognized NBTA certification. Id
The Court next examined which standards should be used in determining
whether the State could regulate this
type of advertisement. The Supreme
Court agreed with the state court that
the standards for commercial speech
under the first amendment applied because Peel's letterhead was a "form of
commercial speech governed by the
'constitutional limitations on the regulation oflawyer advertising.'" Id. at 2287
(quoting In re Peel, 126 Ill.2d 397, 402,
534 N.E.2d 980, 982).
In the case ofInreR.M], 455 U.S. 191
(1982), the Court summarized these
standards as:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.
But when the particular content
or method of advertising suggests
that it is inherently misleading or
when experience has proved that
in fact such advertising is subject
to abuse, the States may impose
appropriate restrictions.
Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2287. However, the
Court in In re R.M] also held that the
states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially
misleading information. Id. (citing In re
R.M], 455 U.S. at 203.)
The Court then evaluated whether
the letterhead was misleading and
whether state censorship was justified.
The Court assumed that some consumers might infer from the sequential
listing of the certification that it exceeded the qualifications for admission
to a state bar. Id. at 2288. However,
since the NBTA's requirements were
verifiable factually, and not statements
of quality or opinion, they were not misleading. Id. In addition, the Court
emphasized that NBTA's certification
was like a trademark, in that, the quality
of the certification was recognized because of the organization granting it. Id.
The state court had argued that the
statements were misleading because consumers might identify the certification
as being issued by the state. The Supreme

Court disagreed, and stated that "we are
satisfied that the consuming public
understands that licenses... are issued
by governmental authorities and that a
host of certificates... are issued by private organizations." ld. at 228Q.
In balancing the State's interest in
avoiding misleading consumers with the
cost of completely banning advertisements of certification, the Court found
that less burdensome alternatives
existed The State could create initial
screening criteria for certifying organizations or require disclaimers on attorney
advertisements about the organizations
or their standards. ld. at 2292-93.
It is interesting to note that Rule 2105( a)( 3) allows for attorneys to advertise specialties in patent or trademark
law. The Court stated that a complete
ban on advertising certifications by the
state would be undermined by allowing
such exceptions. ld. at 2291.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist andJustice Scalia, argued that
the State had a legitimate interest in
regulating abuse in attorney advertising
and that the public could be readily
misled by the juxtaposition on the letterhead of petitioner's licensing and his
NBTA certification. Therefore, consumers could mistakenly conclude that
Peel's services were of higher quality
because of his certification and that the
State had approved the certification. ld.
at 2300 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). As
such a misleading advertisement, the
State had the authority to prevent Peel
from advertising his certification. ld. at
2301 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
In Peel v. Illinois, the United States
Supreme Court upheld an attorney's
right to advertise his certification under
the first amendment commercial
speech standards. States may regulate
advertising certifications but may not
ban their use altogether. Future advertising by attorneys of their certifications
might, therefore, be required to meet
minimum state screening requirements
or be forced to include restricting language such as disclaimers.
-JoanOcboa

Pennsylvania v. Muniz: VIDEOTAPED EVIDENCE CAN BE
ADMITTED AT THE CRIMINAL
TRIALS OF DRUNK DRIVERS
In the drunk driving case of Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 ( 1990),
the United States Supreme Court held
that evidence obtained by way of videotape was admissible because the questions fell within the "routine booking"
exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). The Court also refused
to suppress parts of the videotaped evidence concerning statements made during processing, since they were voluntary and not made during custodial
interrogation.
Inocencio Muniz was arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol
and transported to a booking center
after failing three standard field sobriety
tests. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642. In line
with police procedure, the proceedings
at the booking center were videotaped.
The attending officer first asked Muniz
the standard questions, including his
name, address, height, weight, eye color,
date of birth, and current age, to which
Muniz stumbled over several responses.
The officer then asked Muniz ifhe knew
the date of his sixth birthday which
Muniz was unable to provide. Finally,
Muniz performed the three sobriety
tests that he failed earlier and was
requested to submit to a breathalyzer
test, at which time he made several
incriminating statements. ld. When
Muniz refused to take the breath test, he
was advised of his Miranda rights for the
first time. The videotape of the proceedings was admitted into evidence at his
bench trial. Muniz was subsequently
convicted of driving under the influence
of alcohol. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed his conviction, holding
that once Muniz was arrested and taken
into custody, all utterances and responses were clearly compelled by the
questions presented him during the
booking proceedings. Therefore, the
Court concluded that his responses and
communications were elicited before
he received his Miranda warnings and
should have been suppressed. ld. at
2643.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether various incriminating utterances of a drunk driving suspect, made while performing a series of
sobriety tests, constitute testimonial re-

sponses to custodial interrogation for
purposes of the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment. ld. Eight justices
agreed that most of the statements admitted into evidence did not violate the
accused's fifth amendment rights, although three reached this conclusion
under a different analysis.
The majority opinion began with a
discussion of the types of evidence a
suspect could not be compelled to produce. The Court noted that Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held
that the self-incrimination clause did
not protect a suspect from being compelled to produce "real or physical evidence." Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2643. Yet
the clause did protect an accused from
being compelled to provide evidence of
a testimonial or communicative nature.
Id.

Furthermore, since the utterances
were made prior to Muniz's receiving
his Miranda warnings, the Court also
focused on the "informal compulsion
exerted by the law enforcement officers
during in-custody questioning." ld. at
2644 ( quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
u.s. 436,461 (1966». Thus, the Court
concluded that the case implicated both
the "testimonial" and "compulsion" components of the privilege against selfincrimination in the context of pretrial
questioning. ld.
Next, the Court addressed Muniz's responses to the initial questions regarding name, address, weight, eye color,
date ()fbirth, and current age. Although
MLJniz's responses were incriminating,
to violate th~ self-incrimination clause,
they must have been either testimonial
or elicited by custodial interrogation. ld.
"In order to be testimonial, an accused's
communication must itself, explicitly or
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information." ld. at 2646 ( quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
210 ( 1988) ). In comparison, the Court
cited numerous types of evidence held
not to be testimonial including fingerprinting, photographing, appearing in
court, standing, walking, writing, speaking, and being forced to provide a blood
sample. Finally, the Court concluded
that testimonial evidence encompasses
all responses that, if asked of a sworn
suspect during a criminal trial, would
place the suspect in the cruel trilemma
of self accusation, perjury, or contempt.
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